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THE FORGOTTEN CHILDREN 
OF THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM: 




“They are everybody’s children, and nobody’s children.  They are 
the forgotten children in the . . . foster care system.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year, thousands of children are separated from their families 
and placed into foster care.2  While under the not-so-careful watch of the 
state, many suffer further abuse and neglect.3  In some cases, child 
 Executive Online Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review, Volume 44; J.D., May 
2014, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
 1 CAROLE KEETON STRAYHORN, FORGOTTEN CHILDREN, at xi (2004), available at 
www.hope4kidz.org/pdf/FORGOTTEN_CHILDREN.PDF. 
 2 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, TRENDS IN FOSTER 
CARE AND ADOPTION: FY 2002-FY 2012, at 1 (2013), available at 
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_adoption2012.pdf. 
 3 See, e.g.,, NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, FOSTER CARE VS. FAMILY 
PRESERVATION: THE TRACK RECORD ON SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 1-2 (2011), available at 
www.nccpr.org/reports/01SAFETY.pdf; Patricia Kilday Hart, Judge Paves Way for Class Action 
Lawsuit Over Texas Foster Care System, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Aug. 29, 2013), 
www.houstonchronicle.com/news/columnists/kilday-hart/article/Judge-paves-way-for-class-action-
lawsuit-over-4769761.php (Texas); Martine Powers, Lawsuit Faults Mass. on Foster Care System, 
THE BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 21, 2013), www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/21/class-action-case-
against-mass-child-welfare-system-start-trial-tuesday/yr6NaoTi6mIuCcNLfHXcyL/story.html 
(Massachusetts); Christine Clarridge, DSHS Settles Tacoma Foster Children’s Abuse Case for $11 
Million, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019884510_dshs12m.html (Washington); Benjamin Weiser, 
1
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welfare employees are so derelict in their duties that they are unaware 
children are being harmed. Thus, maltreatment goes undetected.  Despite 
egregious failures to protect the children in its care, the state often suffers 
no repercussions. 
One reason for this travesty is that the “deliberate indifference” 
liability standard4 applied by most courts sets a low bar for the 
government’s duty to protect foster children.5  For example, when a 
caseworker repeatedly fails to perform mandated visits, home studies, 
and other duties, and, as a result, is unaware that a foster child is being 
maltreated, the caseworker’s conduct may not be considered sufficiently 
“conscience shocking”6 for the court to impose liability.7  On the other 
hand, if courts were to adopt the “professional judgment” liability 
standard,8 such a pattern of omissions on the part of a caseworker would 
likely result in a finding of liability and allow the foster child to obtain 
redress. 
The following hypothetical9 illustrates the unjust implications of 
applying the deliberate indifference standard to cases of foster care 
maltreatment, rather than applying the more appropriate professional 
judgment standard. 
City Settles With Disabled People Fraudulently Adopted in ‘90s and Abused, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(Dec. 6, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/nyregion/new-york-city-settles-suit-by-abused-foster-
children.html (New York); Aimee Green, Attorney Files $4.75 Million Lawsuit Against State on 
Behalf of 11-Year-Old Boy Whose Lane County Foster Parents Broke His Bones, Burned Him, 
OREGON LIVE (June 11, 2012), www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2012/06/attorney_files_475_million_law.html (Oregon); Lisa Demer, Sisters 
Awarded $2 Million for Years of Abuse in State Care, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 21, 2012), 
www.adn.com/2012/04/21/2434854/sisters-awarded-2-million-for.html (Alaska). 
 4 Under the deliberate indifference standard, a state agent may be liable if he or she “knows 
of and disregards an excessive risk to [the] health or safety [of someone in state care].” Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This standard will be further discussed below. 
 5 Carolyn A. Kubitscheck, Holding Foster Care Agencies Responsible for Abuse and 
Neglect, 32 HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE (2005), available at 
www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol32_2005/winte
r2005/hr_winter05_fostercare.html. 
 6 As will be discussed below, the Supreme Court held that in order to be liable for a 
violation of due process rights, the conduct in question must “‘shock[] the conscience’ and violate[] 
the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) 
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-72 (1952)). 
 7 See, e.g.,, Omar v. Babcock, 177 F.App’x. 59, 64 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 8 Under the professional judgment standard, a state agent may be liable for actions that are 
“a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.” Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). This standard will be further discussed below. 
 9 This hypothetical is largely based on the heartbreaking story of Demetrius “Omar” 
Jurineack. The facts have been modified to illustrate a circumstance in which the verdict could turn 
on the liability standard applied. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Omar v. Babcock, 549 U.S. 993 
(2006) (No. 06-78); Omar, 177 F.App’x. 59. 
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A CASE FOR THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Cody was only fourteen-months old when his mother abandoned 
him and the Department of Children and Families (DCF) took him into 
state custody. When Cody was almost three, the DCF placed him with 
Marie Wilkes.  Ms. Wilkes fostered and subsequently adopted him.  
During his time in Wilkes’s household, Cody suffered egregious abuse.  
Wilkes beat the young child with a broom handle, hammers, and high-
heeled shoes; repeatedly whipped him with a belt severely enough to 
require hospital treatment; deprived him of food and water for days at a 
time; forced him to eat his own feces; tied him to a bedpost; locked him 
in a dog cage; and more.  Three long years after his placement with 
Wilkes, the DCF finally removed Cody from her custody. 
The DCF failed to protect Cody from abuse in several ways.  First, 
the caseworker assigned to Cody failed to perform a child-specific home 
study prior to placing Cody in Wilkes’s care.  Instead, she relied on a 
study for a female teenager completed over a year prior to Cody’s 
placement.  During that previous study, Wilkes emphasized that she did 
not wish to care for a young child.  Second, during one of several 
hospitalizations prior to his adoption, Cody’s doctor noticed looped 
lesions on his body and reported his suspicion of abuse to the DCF.  In 
addition to this instance, Cody was hospitalized on nine occasions for 
dehydration and unexplained seizures.  While the DCF did perform a 
brief investigation subsequent to the doctor’s report of suspicious 
bruising, it failed to explore whether Cody’s repeated bouts of severe 
dehydration were the result of maltreatment.  Third, DCF records showed 
that Cody’s caseworker failed to make numerous mandatory monthly 
visits to the Wilkes home.  Several of the missed visits occurred during 
the months immediately after the doctor’s report of suspected abuse.  
Despite these signs and the lack of a child-specific home study, the DCF 
allowed Cody to remain in Wilkes’s care and ultimately approved his 
adoption by Wilkes. 
Years later, Cody pursued an action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 to 
vindicate his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  He alleged that the DCF employees involved with his case 
had abdicated their duty to protect him from harm when they placed and 
kept him in Wilkes’s abusive home.  Cody was unable to procure through 
discovery any written evidence that DCF officials were actually aware 
that Wilkes was abusing him.  However, he did present the expert 
testimony of a former DCF official who alleged numerous failures on the 
part of the DCF agents responsible for managing his case.  The expert 
claimed that the DCF employees failed to follow departmental policies, 
3
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including the policy requiring a child-specific home study and the policy 
requiring documentation regarding the reasoning for placement.  
Additionally, the report noted a failure to make the statutorily required 
monthly visits to the Wilkes home.  The expert also concluded that the 
DCF failed to properly train Wilkes prior to placing Cody in her care and 
failed to recognize signs of abuse. 
If the presiding court in Cody’s case were to apply the deliberate 
indifference standard, Cody would likely have been unsuccessful 
because he failed to prove that the DCF workers were deliberately 
indifferent to his safety needs.  In order to satisfy this standard, “an 
official must not only be aware of facts suggesting a substantial risk of 
serious harm to the [child], but the official must also draw the inference 
that the [child] is likely to be harmed.”10  Even if the defendants were 
aware of facts that could lead to the conclusion that Cody was in danger 
of abuse, they would not be held liable if they did not actually draw the 
conclusion. 
If, on the other hand, the court had applied the professional 
judgment standard, Cody would have had a much stronger case.  Under 
that standard, a government actor may be found liable when his or her 
acts or omissions are “such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the 
person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a 
judgment.”11  Thus, if the reason the defendants did not actually 
conclude Cody was in danger of abuse was because they failed to comply 
with statutorily mandated practices and professional standards, they 
would most likely be found liable for the harms he suf
Despite many requests for the Supreme Court to affirm the 
government’s duty to protect foster children and adopt an appropriate 
liability standard, the Court has declined to grant certiorari for any such 
cases.12  Part I of this Comment presents a brief look at the children in 
foster care and the maltreatment they experience, as well as the federal 
and state legislation enacted to provide for their safety.  Part II explores § 
 10 Omar, 177 F.App’x. at 63 (citing Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 
 11 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. 
 12 E.g., Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S.Ct.392 (2010); Omar, 177 F.App’x. at 59, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 993 (2006); Eugene 
D. ex rel. Olivia D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990); Doe 
v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. 
Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 
864 (1983). 
4
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1983 and Supreme Court precedent establishing the duty to protect 
persons from harm caused by private parties, with a focus on the special 
relationship doctrine.  It also discusses the applicable standards of 
liability defined by the Court.  Part III reviews and analyzes the various 
liability standards used in federal and state actions brought by foster 
children for failure to protect them from harm.  Part IV assesses the 
relevant individual and state interests involved in foster care 
maltreatment actions brought under § 1983. This section also compares 
and contrasts these interests to the interests of institutionalized mental 
health patients and prisoners, as these are the subjects of the Supreme 
Courts only holdings regarding the liability standards applicable to 
special relationship cases. Further, it assesses the peculiar circumstances 
of foster children and the heightened duty that the state has to protect 
them from harm.  Finally, it proposes that the Supreme Court should 
recognize the heightened duty to protect foster children from harm and 
adopt the professional judgment standard as the appropriate standard in 
foster care maltreatment actions. 
I. FOSTER CHILDREN & THE LAWS INTENDED TO PROTECT THEM 
A. FOSTER CHILDREN’S PECULIAR NEED FOR PROTECTION 
Children are removed from their homes and placed into foster care 
when the government determines that their parents are unable or 
unwilling to take proper care of them.13  Reasons for removal may 
include abuse, neglect, and abandonment.14  In 2011, over two million 
children came into contact with the child welfare system due to reports of 
alleged abuse or neglect.15  Of those children, over 740,000 were 
confirmed victims of maltreatment.16  Roughly 644,000 children spent 
 13 JAN MCCARTHY ET AL., A FAMILY’S GUIDE TO THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 40-41 
(2003), available at www.cwla.org/childwelfare/fg.pdf. 
 14 Id. (defining abuse to include physical abuse, sexual abuse and emotional abuse). 
 15 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 
2011, at viii (2012), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm11.pdf (Data submitted 
by the States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.  Total is based on the Federal Fiscal Year, 
or October 1 through September 30.). 
 16 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE 
OUTCOMES 2008-2011: REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2013), available at 
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cwo08_11.pdf (defining maltreatment as an incident of abuse 
or neglect). 
5
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time in the public foster care system, with 398,000 children in foster 
care17 on the last day of the year.18 
The maltreatment that leads these children to be removed from their 
parents’ care is just the first level of suffering they experience.19  The 
process of removal then adds an additional layer of trauma the children 
must endure.20  Further, many foster children are subsequently bounced 
from foster home to foster home, which often leads to the development 
of serious behavioral21 and emotional attachment problems.22  Sadly, 
once these already vulnerable children are removed from their homes and 
placed into state care, many are subjected to further maltreatment in their 
foster homes.23  Throughout their young lives, these children experience 
physical and emotional abuse, neglect, abandonment, loss of family 
connections, impermanence, and more.24 
As a result of these traumatic experiences, foster children suffer 
from an increased risk for mental health disorders,25 teen pregnancy,26 
 17 The federal government defines foster care as “24-hour substitute care for children placed 
away from their parents or guardians and for whom the title IV-E agency has placement and care 
responsibility. This includes, but is not limited to, placements in foster family homes, foster homes 
of relatives, group homes, emergency shelters, residential facilities, child care institutions, and 
preadoptive homes.” 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20(a) (Westlaw 2014). 
 18 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, TRENDS IN FOSTER 
CARE AND ADOPTION: FY 2002-FY 2012, at 1 (2013), available at 
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_adoption2012.pdf. 
 19 Delilah Bruskas, Children in Foster Care: A Vulnerable Population at Risk, 21 JCAPN 70, 
70 (May 2008); see also Sheri Wallace, The Grieving Child in Care, CHILD. VOICE MAG.  
(May/June 2003), www.cwla.org/articles/cv0305grieving.htm. 
 20 See UPenn Collaborative on Cmty. Integration, Removal from the Home: Resulting 
Trauma, Temple University Collaborative on Community Inclusion, available at 
http://tucollaborative.org/pdfs/Toolkits_Monographs_Guidebooks/parenting/Factsheet_4_Resulting_
Trauma.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (noting the detrimental psychological and neurobiological 
effects of disruptions in the parent-child attachment); Wallace, CHILD. VOICE MAG. (explaining that 
when the bonds between parent and child are broken by removal, then child must go through a 
grieving process). 
 21 David H. Rubin et al., The Impact of Placement Stability on Behavioral Well-being for 
Children in Foster Care, 119 PEDIATRICS 336, 343 (2007). 
 22 Childhood Mental Health: Attachment, ADVOKIDS, 
http://advokids.org/resources/childhood-mental-health/attachment/ (last visited April 15, 2014). 
 23 See NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, FOSTER CARE VS. FAMILY PRESERVATION: 
THE TRACK RECORD ON SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 1-2 (2011), available at 
www.nccpr.org/reports/01SAFETY.pdf. 
 24 NINA WILLIAMS-MBENGUE, MOVING CHILDREN OUT OF FOSTER CARE: THE LEGISLATIVE 
ROLE IN FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN 2 (2008), available at 
www.ncsl.org/documents/cyf/movingchildrenoutofcare.pdf. 
 25 One study found that 47.9% of foster children have “clinically significant emotional and 
behavioral problems.” As adults, over 50% of former foster children experience mental illness, 
compared to 22% of the control group. Another particularly disturbing study found that 30% of 
former foster children have been diagnosed with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which was 
6
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homelessness,27 academic failure,28 and incarceration.29  Thus, it is vital 
that the state and child welfare agencies do everything they can to keep 
these children safe.  In furtherance of that obligation, numerous laws, 
regulations, and professional standards have been developed to establish 
the framework for the state’s protection of its most vulnerable children. 
B. LAWS ENACTED TO SAFETGUARD THE WELL-BEING OF FOSTER 
CHILDREN 
Federal involvement in child protection began in 1912, when 
Congress enacted legislation to establish the Children’s Bureau, a federal 
agency dedicated to child welfare issues.30  Several years later, the Social 
Security Act (1935) was enacted, creating the Child Welfare Services 
Program.31  Through this program, the federal government provides 
funding to the states for child protective services and foster care 
almost twice the rate of PTSD found in veterans who had been in combat.  Joann Grayson, Mental 
Health Needs of Foster Children and Children at Risk of Removal, CYF NEWS, Winter 2012, at 2-3, 
available at www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/newsletter/2012/01/winter.pdf. 
 26 Approximately 51% of female teens in foster care will become pregnant, compared to 20% 
of other female teens. 46% of those females in foster care will have multiple pregnancies before the 
age of 19.  Heather D. Boonstra, Teen Pregnancy Among Young Women in Foster Care: A Primer, 
14 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 8, 9 (2011), available at 
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/14/2/gpr140208.pdf. 
 27 National studies indicate a homelessness rate of between 12-30% of former foster children 
who aged out of the system.  Facts About Aging Out, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, 
www.childrensrights.org/issues-resources/foster-care/facts-about-aging-out/ (last visited April 15, 
2014); A study of former foster children in the Midwestern U.S. found that by the age of 26, 36% 
had been homeless at some point in their lives.  Predictors of Homelessness During Transition from 
Foster Care to Adulthood, CHAPIN HALL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 
www.chapinhall.org/research/inside/predictors-homelessness-during-transition-foster-care-adulthood 
(last visited April 15, 2014). 
 28 Foster children are 2.5-3.5 times as likely to receive special education than other children, 
3 times more likely to be expelled, and 2 times as likely to be absent.  NAT’L WORKING GRP. ON 
FOSTER CARE & EDUC., FOSTERING SUCCESS IN EDUCATION: NATIONAL FACTSHEET ON THE 
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 1 (2014), available at 
www.fostercareandeducation.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?EntryId=127
9&Command=Core_Download&method=inline&PortalId=0&TabId=124. 
 29 WILLIAMS-MBENGUE, MOVING CHILDREN OUT OF FOSTER CARE 2; see also Facts About 
Aging Out, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (reporting that national studies indicate that, of foster children who 
aged out of the system, between 18-26% were incarcerated). 
 30 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE STORY OF THE 
CHILDREN’S BUREAU 4 (2012), available at 
http://cb100.acf.hhs.gov/sites/all/themes/danland/danblog/files/Story_of_CB.pdf. 
 31 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNED WITH 
CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION 2 n.1 (2012), available at 
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegis.pdf. 
7
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services.32  In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act (CAPTA).33  CAPTA provides funding for child 
maltreatment-related research, training, and program development. 34  It 
also established child maltreatment reporting requirements and 
established the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (now the 
Office on Child Abuse and Neglect).35  Other significant federal laws 
enacted for the benefit of foster children36 include the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act of 1997,37 the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999,38 and 
the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 
2008.39 
Today, the Children’s Bureau works with state, tribal, federal, and 
local agencies to promote the safety and well-being of children through 
the development of programs to prevent child maltreatment.40  A crucial 
responsibility of the Bureau is to monitor state foster care systems.41  In 
accord with Social Security Act requirements, the Children’s Bureau 
tracks data regarding the maltreatment of children in foster care, with the 
 32 Id. 
 33 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ABOUT CAPTA: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (2011), 
available at www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/about.pdf. See generally Child Abuse Prevention 
and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5119c (Westlaw 2014) (provides funding in support of 
investigation, prevention, and identification of abuse and neglect of children). 
 34 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE STORY OF THE 
CHILDREN’S BUREAU 15. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
CONCERNED WITH CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION 3. 
 37 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
105publ89/html/PLAW-105publ89.htm (providing for improved permanency planning for children 
in foster care). 
 38 Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
106publ169/pdf/PLAW-106publ169.pdf (providing states with additional funding to implement 
programs to aid foster children with the transition from state care to independence). 
 39 Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), available at 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ351/html/PLAW-110publ351.htm (providing for increased 
support for relative caregivers, improved outcomes for foster children, tribal access to foster care and 
adoption, and adoption incentives ). 
 40 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 
2012, at 1 (2013), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2012.pdf. 
 41 The Bureau monitors foster care systems through Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and 
Reporting System assessment reviews, Child and Family Services Reviews, Statewide Automated 
Child Welfare Information System assessment reviews, and Title IV-E foster care eligibility reviews.  
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Children’s Bureau, Monitoring, ACF: CHILDREN’S BUREAU, 
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/monitoring (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
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ultimate goal of reducing the incidence of abuse and neglect.42  Another 
important function of the Children’s Bureau is to administer a number of 
funding programs to support state foster care programs and child 
protective programs.43 
For a state to receive federal funding for its foster care programs, 
the state must establish and maintain basic licensing standards that 
correspond with the recommendations of certain national organizations,44 
including standards related to safety and the protection of civil rights.45  
The intent of these licensing requirements is to reduce the risk of harm to 
foster children and to ensure that they are provided with a “safe, stable, 
nurturing environment.”46  One licensing requirement of vital importance 
is that each member of a foster household must pass a background check 
showing no record of child abuse or neglect and no convictions for 
certain crimes.47  Additionally, licensing requirements generally include 
a minimum age, a minimum income, and adequate physical and mental 
health.48  Most states also require that prospective foster parents 
complete a training course prior to becoming licensed,49 and some states 
require regular maintenance training after licensure.50  Finally, most 
 42 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 
2012, at 90. 
 43 See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
CONCERNED WITH CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION 2 (2012), available at 
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegis.pdf (including title IV-B Child Welfare 
Services and Promoting Safe and Stable Families programs, the title IV-E Foster Care Program, the 
title IV-E Adoption Assistance Program, and the title IV-E Chafee Foster Care Independence 
Program); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 2012, at 1. 
 44 One such organization is the Child Welfare League of America. See Children’s Welfare 
League of Am., History: The Role of CWLA in Standards Development, CWLA, 
www.cwla.org/programs/standards/history.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
 45 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(10) (Westlaw 2014). 
 46 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, HOME STUDY REQUIREMENTS FOR PROSPECTIVE 
FOSTER PARENTS 1 (2011), available at 
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/homestudyreqs.pdf. 
 47 Disqualifying crimes under federal law include felony child abuse or neglect, spousal 
abuse, a crime against children (including child pornography), a crime involving violence (including 
rape, sexual assault, or homicide), and if within the prior five years, felony assault, felony battery, or 
a felony drug offense. Moreover, disqualifying crimes under state laws may include any other crime 
of violence, arson, kidnapping, illegal use of weapons or explosives, fraud, forgery, burglary, and 
robbery.  CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PROSPECTIVE 
FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 1-2 (2011), available at 
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/background.pdf. 
 48 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, HOME STUDY REQUIREMENTS FOR PROSPECTIVE 
FOSTER PARENTS 2. 
 49 Id. at 3. 
 50 See id. at 11 passim. 
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states require a home study to evaluate whether the household is suitable 
for providing a safe home for foster children.51 
In addition to licensing and home study requirements, most states 
have created standards for caseworker performance in order to prevent 
maltreatment and improve outcomes for children.52  For example, forty-
three states require that caseworkers visit with foster children at least 
once a month, to regularly assess the children’s well-being.53  Many 
states have also adopted quality standards for caseworker visits, 
addressing such issues as safety needs and communication.54  As the 
frequency and quality of caseworker visits increase, so do positive 
outcomes for foster children.55  When caseworkers maintain regular 
contact and open lines of communication with foster children, they are in 
a better position to evaluate their needs and to discover maltreatment.56 
Despite these protective measures, foster children across the nation 
continue to be abused and neglected while in state care.57  When the 
child welfare system fails them, many foster children turn to litigation. 
II. WHEN THE STATE FAILS TO PROTECT: 42 U.S.C.A. SECTION 1983 
& THE STATE’S DUTY UNDER THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
DOCTRINE 
Where the state has failed to protect a foster child from abuse and 
neglect, the child may pursue legal action against the child welfare 
agencies, officials, and employees responsible for their care.  Aggrieved 
 51 Id. at 5. 
 52 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS 
WITH CHILDREN AND PARENTS 3 (2006), available at 
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cyf/caseworkervisits.pdf. 
 53 Id.; But see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD 
WELFARE OUTCOMES 2008-2011: REPORT TO CONGRESS 19 (2013), available at 
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cwo08_11.pdf (reporting that only approximately 82% 
received monthly visits in 2011). 
 54 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS 
WITH CHILDREN AND PARENTS 4. 
 55 Id. at 1; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
STATE STANDARDS AND PRACTICES FOR CONTENT OF CASEWORKER VISITS WITH CHILDREN IN 
FOSTER CARE 1 (2005), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-03-00351.pdf (reporting 
that findings of Child and Family Service Reviews (CFSRs) show a correlation between a positive 
rating on caseworker visits and positive ratings on other areas under review, including permanency 
and child safety). 
 56 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS 
WITH CHILDREN AND PARENTS 5. 
 57 See NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, FOSTER CARE VS. FAMILY PRESERVATION: 
THE TRACK RECORD ON SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 1-2 (2011), available at 
www.nccpr.org/reports/01SAFETY.pdf. 
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children may bring a suit under state tort laws.58  They may also bring § 
1983 actions against the state for violations of rights granted by some of 
the aforementioned federal laws.59  Finally, they may bring § 1983 
actions for violations of their substantive due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.60 
To determine what must be proven in a § 1983 action against the 
state for violations of a foster child’s rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, one must look to both the statute and to a line of Supreme 
Court cases regarding the government’s duty to protect.  In DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County, the Court described exceptions to the general rule 
that the state has no affirmative duty to protect people from harm caused 
by private parties.61  One of the exceptions is the “special relationship 
doctrine,” which lower courts have applied to the relationship between 
the state and foster children in its care.62  While the Supreme Court has 
yet to hear a special relationship action brought by a foster child, lower 
courts have assessed the rights of foster children and determined the 
applicable liability standards under § 1983 by looking to Supreme Court 
cases that have defined the state’s duty to protect in other contexts. 
A. RIGHT TO REDRESS UNDER §1983 FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
When deprived of a right granted by the Constitution or federal law, 
an aggrieved party may bring a private action against the responsible 
government agents under § 1983.63  Enacted as part of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but a 
 58 See Eric M. Larsson & Jean A. Talbot, Cause of Action for Negligent Placement in or 
Supervision of Foster Home, 43 COA2D 1 § 5 (Dec. 2013). Beyond this reference, this Comment 
will not discuss state tort actions. 
 59 See id. at § 10. Beyond this reference, this Comment will not discuss § 1983 actions for 
violations of rights granted by federal laws. 
 60 See id. 
 61 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
 62 See, e.g., Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 880 
(5th Cir. 2004); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 63 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2014) (stating in pertinent part: “Every person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District 
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). 
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means for asserting other federal rights.64  To establish an action under § 
1983, the plaintiff must prove that the harmful action occurred “under 
color of state law”65 and that it caused a deprivation of a constitutional 
right or a federal statutory right.66  While not expressly stated in § 1983, 
the plaintiff must also show that the government actor possessed the 
requisite state of mind to be held liable for the underlying violation.67  
The applicable state-of-mind requirement, or liability standard, depends 
on the constitutional or statutory right that has been deprived.68 
When the state has failed to protect a foster child from 
maltreatment, the rights implicated are those substantive due process 
rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.69  Specifically, the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty interest in a safe environment 
and the interest in being free from unreasonable risks of harm.70  As the 
Eleventh Circuit has explained: 
[T]he child’s physical safety was a primary objective in placing the 
child in the foster home. The state’s action in assuming the 
responsibility of finding and keeping the child in a safe environment 
place[s] an obligation on the state to insure the continuing safety of 
that environment. The state’s failure to meet that obligation, as 
evidenced by the child’s injuries, in the absence of overriding societal 
interests, constitute[s] a deprivation of liberty under the fourteenth 
amendment.71 
 64 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 
144 n.3 (1979)). 
 65 Requires that the defendant “exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made 
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 
U.S. 42, 49 (1998) (quoting U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 
 66 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 
 67 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997). 
 68 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (citing the following examples: Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (invidious discriminatory purpose 
required for claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause) and Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97 (1976) (“deliberate indifference” to prisoner’s serious illness or injury sufficient to 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment)). 
 69 See, e.g., Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t 
of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 1992); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 
791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 70 Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) 
(bodily integrity as a liberty interest); Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341 (freedom from bodily injury as a 
liberty interest). 
 71 Taylor, 818 F.2d 791 at 795. 
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That being said, while an act perpetrated by a government agent that 
directly harms a person would be considered an unconstitutional 
deprivation of liberty, a failure to actively prevent harm caused by 
private parties does not generally subject the state to liability.72  So, 
when a foster child has been maltreated by his or her foster parent, the 
child must rely on one of the exceptions to the “no-duty rule”73 the 
Supreme Court set forth in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
B. STATE’S LIMITED DUTY TO PROTECT AGAINST HARM CAUSED BY 
PRIVATE PARTIES 
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court affirmed the general principle that 
the state has no constitutional duty to protect people from harm caused 
by private parties, explaining that “nothing in the language of the Due 
Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and 
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”74  The minor 
plaintiff, Joshua DeShaney, sued child welfare agents under § 1983 for 
failing to protect him from the abuse of his father, alleging that the 
failure was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process rights.75  Joshua’s caseworkers had been repeatedly alerted to 
suspicions that his father was abusing him, but chose not to remove 
Joshua from his father’s care.76  Approximately two years after the first 
allegations of abuse were reported, Joshua’s father beat him into a coma, 
leaving him with permanent injuries so severe that Joshua would spend 
the remainder of his life in an institution.77  The Court found that, as the 
state had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua from his father, the 
failure to protect him did not constitute a violation of his due process 
rights.78  Thus, the child welfare agents could not be held liable under § 
1983.79 
The Court noted in its decision, however, that certain circumstances 
exist where the Constitution may impose a duty upon government actors 
 72 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
 73 See Laura Oren, DeShaney and “State-Created Danger”: Does the Exception Make the 
“No-Duty” Rule?, 35-SUM ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 3, 3-4 (2010). 
 74 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
 75 Id. at 194-95. 
 76 Id. at 192-93. 
 77 Id. at 193. 
 78 Id. at 202. 
 79 Id. 
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to affirmatively protect persons from harm.80  Two exceptions to the 
DeShaney no-duty rule have been recognized (1) where the state has 
created the danger81 or (2) where there exists a special relationship 
between the harmed party and the state.82  If one of these exceptions 
applies, and the state therefore has an affirmative duty to protect 
someone, the responsible government agents may be held liable for their 
actions and for the failure to act when necessary.83 
The “special relationship doctrine” applies when the state has taken 
a person into custody “against his [or her] will,” effectively restraining 
the person’s “freedom to act on his [or her] own behalf.”84  In that 
instance, the state must then assume the duty to provide for the person’s 
basic needs, including the need for safety.85  Where the government fails 
to provide for these needs, it can be held liable in a § 1983 action for the 
violation of the individual’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or 
the Eighth Amendment.86 
At the time DeShaney was decided, the Supreme Court had already 
decided that the state had affirmative duties to protect prisoners87 and 
involuntarily committed mental patients, and they could, therefore, bring 
§ 1983 actions against government actors for failures to protect them 
from harm.88  Although the Court also noted that a similar action might 
lie when a child has been removed from his home and placed into foster 
care, it did not conclusively decide the issue.89  While a few courts had 
recognized the duty to protect foster children from harm prior to 
 80 Id. at 198 (summarizing the protections afforded in Estelle v. Gamble and Youngberg v. 
Romeo). 
 81 Id. at 201; see also Schnurr v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 189 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1122-1123 (D. 
Colo. 2001).  Beyond this mention, the state created danger exception is outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
 82 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; see also Schnurr, 189 F.Supp.2d at 1122-1123. 
 83 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198. 
 84 Id. at 200. 
 85 Id. at 199-200 (“e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety”). 
 86 Id. at 198. 
 87 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). 
 88 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). 
 89 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. 
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DeShaney,90 the duty has subsequently been found to exist by most state 
and federal courts.91 
Since the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the duty to protect 
foster children, lower courts have developed their standards by looking 
to the following string of Supreme Court cases that address the state’s 
duty to protect people from harm. 
C. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY IN DUTY TO PROTECT CASES 
In two seminal cases, the Supreme Court addressed the state’s duty 
to protect under the special relationship doctrine, establishing different 
liability standards in each instance.92  In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme 
Court held that the liability standard in prison maltreatment cases is 
deliberate indifference,93 and in Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court held that 
the standard in mental institution maltreatment cases is the professional 
judgment standard.94  Since then, the Court has refined and clarified 
 90 See, e.g., Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[A] 
child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation so analogous to a prisoner in a penal 
institution and a child confined in a mental health facility that the foster child may bring a section 
1983 action.”); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing 
that a child in state custody has a constitutional right not to be placed in a foster care setting known 
to be unsafe). 
 91 See, e.g., Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]hen the state 
places a child in state-regulated foster care, the state has entered into a special relationship with that 
child which imposes upon it certain affirmative duties. The failure to perform such duties can give 
rise, under sufficiently culpable circumstances, to liability under section 1983.”); Norfleet v. Ark. 
Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t was clearly established . . . that the 
state had an obligation to provide adequate medical care, protection and supervision [to foster 
children].”); Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 892-93 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (Children have a “clearly established right to protection while in foster care.”); Meador v. 
Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[D]ue process extends the right 
to be free from the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in state-regulated foster homes.”); K.H. 
ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Youngberg made the basic duty of 
the state to children in state custody clear, and . . . the duty [can] not be avoided by substituting 
private for public custodians.”); J.R. v. Gloria, 599 F.Supp.2d 182, 194-95 (D.R.I. 2009) 
(recognizing an “affirmative duty to ensure the safety and well-being” of foster children); Braam ex 
rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 856 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (recognizing “foster children possess 
substantive due process rights” to protection from harm); Kara B. v. Dane Cnty., 555 N.W.2d 630, 
637 (Wisc. 1996) (Foster children have a “clearly established constitutional right under the Due 
Process Clause to safe and secure placement in a foster home”). But see White ex rel. v. Chambliss, 
112 F.3d 731, 738 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e cannot say that a right to affirmative state protection for 
children placed in foster care was clearly established.”). 
 92 Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307; Estelle, 429 U.S. 97. 
 93 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
 94 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. 
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these standards multiple times.  Particularly significant were its holdings 
in Farmer v. Brennan95 and County of Sacramento v. Lewis.96 
In Estelle, the Supreme Court established the liability standard 
under the Eighth Amendment for harm suffered by prisoners while in 
government care.97  The plaintiff was a prisoner who brought a § 1983 
action against the state, claiming that inadequate medical care resulted in 
a violation of his Eight Amendment right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment.98  The Court applied the deliberate indifference 
standard, under which state actors may be liable only if they are 
deliberately indifferent to the basic needs of the plaintiffs.99  In 
describing what action was illustrative of deliberate indifference, the 
Court cited various examples of intentional acts by government 
employees.100 
Several years later, the Supreme Court asserted that deliberate 
indifference was akin to criminal recklessness, explaining that “acting or 
failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious 
harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that 
risk.”101  In Farmer v. Brennan, the Court held that, in actions brought 
by prisoners alleging inhumane conditions, the plaintiff must show that 
the responsible prison official was aware of facts “from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, 
and he must also draw the inference.”102  Thus, as used in the Eighth 
Amendment context, deliberate indifference requires that the government 
agent subjectively knew of the risk of harm to the plaintiff.103 
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court set forth the liability standard 
applicable when an involuntarily institutionalized mental health patient 
has been harmed while in state care.104  The plaintiff, a man who was 
substantially mentally disabled, had allegedly been injured over sixty 
times during the first two and a half years he spent in a state mental 
 95 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
 96 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 97 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
 98 Id. at 101. 
 99 Id. at 104. 
 100 Id. at 104-05, 104 n.10 (noting examples of intentional conduct, including the “injection of 
penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was allergic,” “refusal of paramedic to provide treatment,” 
and “prison physician refuses to administer the prescribed pain killer and renders leg surgery 
unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary instructions of surgeon”). 
 101 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). 
 102 Id. at 837. 
 103 Id. at 838. 
 104 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982). 
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institution.105  The Court determined that mental health patients were 
“entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions” than prisoners.106  
In finding there should be a higher standard of care, the Court held that 
the interests of the state must be balanced against the rights of the 
individual.107  Under the professional judgment standard, a government 
actor is liable when his or her actions are “such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional108 judgment, practice, or standards as to 
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision 
on such a judgment.”109 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court clarified that in order for a state 
agent to be held liable, the challenged action must “shock[] the 
conscience.”110  In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Court explained 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process provision 
protects against “arbitrary action,” and that to be sufficiently arbitrary, 
the challenged conduct must shock the conscience in violation of the 
“decencies of civilized conduct.”111  Negligently inflicted harm may 
never be sufficiently shocking to be considered a constitutional 
violation.112  Conversely, intentionally injurious conduct is highly likely 
to shock the conscience.113  Where the government actor’s state of mind 
falls in between those two poles, liability depends on “an exact analysis 
of the circumstances” involved.114 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the state of mind required to 
establish liability in § 1983 actions brought by foster children, creating a 
split among federal and state courts as to which liability standard to 
apply.115  Many courts require that the plaintiff prove that the 
 105 Id. at 310. 
 106 Id. at 321-22. 
 107 Id. at 321. 
 108 The Court defined a “professional” as “a person competent, whether by education, training 
or experience, to make the particular decision at issue.” Id. at 323 n.30. 
 109 Id. at 323. 
 110 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (noting shocks-the-conscience 
test first applied in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). 
 111 Id. at 845-46. 
 112 Id. at 849; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). 
 113 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854 (explaining, for example, that when a police officer 
has engaged in a high-speed chase, his or her conduct may only be considered conscious shocking if 
the officer “inten[ded] to harm [the] suspect[] physically or to worsen their legal plight.”). 
 114 Id. at 850. 
 115 See, e.g., Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(deliberate indifference standard); Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & 
Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 881 (5th Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference); Yvonne L. ex rel. 
Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir. 1992) (professional judgment 
standard); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981) (deliberate 
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government was deliberately indifferent,116 others apply the professional 
judgment standard,117 some require subjective knowledge of harm,118 
some apply an objective standard,119 and some apply a “shocks-the-
conscience” analysis,120 while others do not.121  So, decades after the 
first court recognized the right of a foster child to bring a § 1983 
action,122 there remains no clear liability st
III. COURTS SPLIT OVER DUTY TO PROTECT & APPLICABLE LIABILITY 
STANDARD IN FOSTER CARE MALTREATMENT CASES 
Without the direction of a Supreme Court holding, courts presiding 
over foster care maltreatment cases have adopted myriad variations of 
the deliberate indifference and professional judgment standards.  In 
defining the applicable liability standard, a court delineates the bounds of 
the state’s duty to protect, which consequently affects foster children’s 
constitutionally protected liberty interests.  Unfortunately, courts have 
often decided which standard to use, not by assessing the interests of the 
maltreated foster children before them, but rather by looking to other 
courts, mechanically applying the standard presented by the parties, or 
making inapt comparisons between prisoners and foster children. 
A. DELIBERATE INDIFFERANCE STANDARD IN FOSTER CARE CASES 
In foster care abuse cases, a significant number of courts have 
chosen to adopt the deliberate indifference standard originally set forth in 
the prisoner’s rights action, Estelle v. Gamble,123 a standard many 
indifference); T.M. ex rel. R.T. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (D. Wyo. 2000) (professional 
judgment); Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 858 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (professional 
judgment standard). 
 116 See, e.g., Tamas, 630 F.3d at 844; Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 881; Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 
798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 291-292 
(8th Cir. 1993); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 141. 
 117 See, e.g., Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 894; T.M. ex rel. R.T., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (D. Wyo. 
2000); Braam, 81 P.3d at 858. 
 118 See, e.g., Tamas, 630 F.3d at 845; Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 881; J.R. v. Gloria, 599 
F.Supp.2d 182, 196 (D.R.I. 2009). 
 119 See, e.g., Nicini, 212 F.3d at 811-12; Kara B. v. Dane Cnty., 542 N.W.2d 777, 787 (Wisc. 
Ct. App. 1996). 
 120 See, e.g., Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 880; Nicini, 212 F.3d at 810; Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. 
Patrick, 771 F.Supp.2d 142, 163 (D.Mass. 2011). 
 121 See, e.g., Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2012); Phelan ex rel. Phelan v. 
Torres, 843 F.Supp.2d 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 122 See Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 123 Nicini, 212 F.3d at 810. 
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consider the “minimum standard of care required to meet the State’s 
substantive due process duties . . . .”124  Some courts have further refined 
the deliberate indifference test in accord with the holding in another 
prisoners’ rights case, Farmer v. Brennan, that subjective knowledge is 
required.125  After the Farmer decision, courts have required less and 
less of child welfare agents.  However, in its infancy, the deliberate 
indifference standard as applied to foster care maltreatment lawsuits 
allowed for greater consideration of caseworkers’ failure to comply with 
their professional duties. 
One of the first courts to recognize the right of foster children to 
bring a § 1983 action for maltreatment was the Second Circuit.  In Doe v. 
New York City Department of Social Services, a case decided before 
Youngberg, the court applied the Estelle standard.126  In order to be 
found liable, the court held that a defendant must be “deliberate[ly] 
indifferen[t] to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty[.]”127  
The court also explained that the standard was “closely associated” with 
gross negligence,128 in that “gross negligent conduct creates a strong 
presumption of deliberate indifference.”129  One of the plaintiff’s 
allegations was that the defendants failed to perform certain statutory 
duties designed to protect children from maltreatment, including the duty 
to report suspected abuse.130  The court held that, while there may be no 
strict liability for failure to perform such duties, evidence of the failure to 
report was relevant to the issue of deliberate indifference.131  In doing so, 
the court affirmed its prior holdings that deliberate indifference could be 
inferred from a “pattern of omissions.”132 
 124 Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 858 (Wash. 2003) (en banc); see also Doe v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 790 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding the deliberate 
indifferences standard is “stricter” than the professional judgment standard); Wendy H. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 849 F.Supp. 367, 371-72 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (noting the deliberate indifference standard is 
“more permissive” than the professional judgment standard). 
 125 See, e.g., Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 845 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 881; J.R. v. Gloria, 599 F.Supp.2d 182, 196 (D.R.I. 2009). 
 126 Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 141. 
 127 Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
 128 The court noted that “Traditionally the term ‘gross negligence’ has been held equivalent to 
the words ‘reckless and wanton,’. . . and the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble. . . has 
characterized deliberate indifference as ‘the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.’” Doe v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 143 n.4. 
 129 Id. at 143. 
 130 Id. at 140. 
 131 Id. at 146-47. 
 132 Id. at 145. 
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After Doe v. N.Y.C., other courts began to acknowledge the right of 
foster children to be free from maltreatment while in state care.133  One 
such court was the Eleventh Circuit, which initially modeled its liability 
standard after the standard applied by the court in Doe.134  The court 
chose to use the deliberate indifference standard even though they noted 
that the liberty interest was similar to the liberty interest in Youngberg.135  
Subsequent to making this comparison between foster children and 
mental health patients, the court proceeded to look to the Second 
Circuit’s analysis of the similarities between foster children and prison 
inmates,136 abandoning further consideration of Youngberg. 
In addition to looking to other circuits, many courts that have 
applied the deliberate indifference standard have done so solely because 
it was the standard presented by the parties.137  For example, in choosing 
to use the deliberate indifference standard,138 the Third Circuit did not 
consider the professional judgment standard of Youngberg.139  The court 
also did not assess whether to apply the objective “should have known” 
test or the subjective “actually knew” test asserted in Farmer, adopting 
the plaintiff’s objective analysis without question.140  Instead, the court 
focused heavily on whether the defendant’s conduct was conscience 
shocking.141  The court also declined to address whether a failure to act 
on the part of a state agent could ever constitute deliberate 
indifference.142 
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, did apply the deliberate 
indifference standard set forth in Farmer, which includes both a 
subjective and an objective element. 143  The court held that for deliberate 
 133 See, e.g., Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987); 
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1987); Gibson v. 
Merced Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 799 F. 2d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 134 Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795-96 (“Defendants may be liable. . . if they. . . exhibited deliberate 
indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty. . .”).  The Eleventh Circuit 
subsequently adopted the deliberate indifference standard used in Farmer, requiring subjective 
knowledge that the child was at substantial risk of harm. Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 135 Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795. 
 136 Id. at 796. 
 137 See, e.g., Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Gibson, 799 F. 
2d at 589-90; Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). 
 138 Nicini, 212 F.3d at 811. 
 139 Id. at 811 n.9. 
 140 Id. at 811-12. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 812. 
 143 Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 
872, 881 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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indifference to be established, the state actor “must be both aware of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”144  The court 
also stressed that the subjective element may be inferred “from the fact 
that the risk of harm is obvious.”145  Clarifying that it did not intend to 
weaken the standard, the court further explained that deliberate 
indifference was a higher standard than gross negligence.146 
Again relying on the liability standard used by sister courts, the 
Ninth Circuit adopted the deliberate indifference standard with no 
consideration of the professional judgment standard.147 The court opted 
to interpret the standard to require both an objective and a subjective 
element,148 and to require that the state agent’s behavior “shocks the 
conscience.”149  Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also decided that 
the subjective element may be inferred where the risk of harm was 
obvious,150 such that “a reasonable official would have been compelled 
to draw that inference.”151  In so defining the deliberate indifference 
standard, the court injected objectivity into the supposedly subjective 
element of the standard. 
Overall, in defining the duty to protect foster children and 
determining which liability standard to adopt, most circuit courts have 
failed to carefully consider the peculiar circumstances of foster children.  
Unfortunately, neither have many of the courts that have adopted the 
professional judgment standard. 
B. PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD IN FOSTER CARE CASES 
While most courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard, 
a few courts have opted to use modified versions of the professional 
judgment standard set forth in Youngberg.152  Additionally, while the 
 144 Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 
 145 Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)). 
 146 Id. at 882. 
 147 Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 148 Id. at 845. 
 149 Id. at 844 (“deliberate indifference to a known or so obvious as to imply knowledge of, 
danger.” (quoting Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006))). 
 150 Id. at 845 (citing Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory 
Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 881 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See, e.g., Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 
(10th Cir. 1992); Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F.Supp.2d 142, 163 (D.Mass. 2011); T.M. 
ex rel. R.T. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Wyo. 2000); Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F.Supp.2d 
476, 507 (D.N.J., 2000); Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F.Supp.2d 638, 646 (E.D.Pa. 1999); 
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Supreme Court and numerous other courts have asserted that a difference 
exists between the deliberate indifference and professional judgment 
standards,153 a few courts have concluded that there is virtually no 
difference between the two standards.154 
The Seventh Circuit, for example, initially155 elected to apply a 
version of the professional judgment standard that was essentially 
equivalent to the deliberate indifference standard.156  The court held that 
the professional judgment standard did not “impose . . . [a] duty of 
inquiry in these cases.”157  So, liability could only attach where the 
defendants knew of or suspected that the child was being maltreated.158  
Only then could the state actor’s behavior shock the conscience.  In an 
earlier case, the Seventh Circuit also made clear that government agents 
could only be held liable for placing a foster child with a person or 
people “they know to be dangerous or otherwise unfit.”159  The dissent in 
that case noted that the standard applied by the Seventh Circuit was more 
stringent than that set forth in Youngberg.160 
Upon consideration of the standard set forth by the Seventh Circuit, 
the Tenth Circuit noted that it “doubt[ed] there is much difference” 
between that standard and the deliberate indifference standard, as applied 
in the foster care context.161  Nonetheless, the court elected to apply the 
LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 996 (D.D.C. 1991); Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 
851, 858 (Wash. 2003) (en banc); Kara B. ex rel. Albert v. Dane Cnty., 555 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Wis. 
1996). 
 153 See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982); Terrence v. Northville Reg’l 
Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 848 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that Youngberg provides “heightened 
constitutional protection” over deliberate indifference standard.); Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 
843 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Applying the deliberate indifference standard. . . would be giving involuntarily 
committed patients the same treatment as that afforded to convicted prisoners, a result the 
Youngberg Court specifically condemned.”); Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 
1996) (concluding the professional judgment standard requires less than deliberate indifference); 
Shaw ex rel. Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1150 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he plaintiff carries a 
greater burden when trying to show deliberate indifference than when trying to establish a failure to 
exercise professional judgment.”). 
 154 See Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 894; Weatherford ex rel. Michael L. v. State, 81 P.3d 320, 329. 
 155 After Lewis v. Anderson and K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, the Seventh Circuit described 
the standard as a “modified deliberate indifference standard,” rejecting the professional judgment 
standard set forth in Youngberg. J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 156 Mark Strasser, Deliberate Indifference, Professional Judgment, and the Constitution: On 
Liberty Interests in the Child Placement Context, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 231 (2008). 
 157 Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 158 Id. 
 159 K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 854 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 160 Id. at 862 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
 161 Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
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professional judgment standard, recognizing that like the mental health 
patients in Youngberg, foster children are entitled to more considerate 
treatment than prison inmates.162  As opposed to the Seventh Circuit, the 
Tenth Circuit did not require that the plaintiff prove the defendant 
subjectively knew that the harm was occurring.163  So, if a caseworker 
has exercised no professional judgment in placing the child, whether he 
knew the child was being maltreated or not, the caseworker might be 
found liable for the resulting harm.164 
Noting that the holding of the Tenth Circuit case created confusion 
about how the professional judgment standard should be applied,165 the 
District Court of Wyoming looked to the analysis of the standard 
presented by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.166  The court stressed 
that to require actual knowledge of abuse “would encourage an ‘ostrich’ 
approach to placement of foster children, where a victimized foster child 
could be left at the mercy of abusers, just as long as the state agent never 
‘knew or suspected’ that the child was being abused.”167  Furthermore, 
the court recounted the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Seitz in the 
Third Circuit’s holding in Youngberg,168 which had been cited and 
adopted in the Supreme Court’s opinion in the same case.169  In Judge 
Seitz’s concurrence, he asserted that state agents “have an affirmative 
obligation to discover the needs of . . . patients, and to respond to those 
needs in an adequate manner.”170  The District Court of Wyoming 
concluded that the Supreme Court intended for the professional judgment 
standard to require only that the government actor exercised professional 
judgment, and that liability may not be avoided by showing a lack of 
knowledge of harm.171 
If all courts would take the approach of the District Court of 
Wyoming, which included a thoughtful assessment of the interests and 
circumstances of foster children and a close look at the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Youngberg, they would realize that the professional judgment 
standard is the appropriate standard to apply in foster care maltreatment 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. (holding that the professional judgment standard “does not require actual knowledge 
the children will be harmed”). 
 164 Id. at 893-94. 
 165 T.M. ex rel. R.T. v. Carson, 93 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1188 (D.Wyo. 2000). 
 166 Id. at 1190. 
 167 Id. (citing Wendy H. v. City of Philadelphia, 849 F.Supp. 367, 371-72 (E.D.Pa. 1994)). 
 168 Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 173 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J. concurring). 
 169 T.M. ex rel. R.T., 93 F.Supp.2d at 1192. 
 170 Id. (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 177 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 171 Id. (citing Wendy H. v. City of Philadelphia, 849 F.Supp. 367, 373 (E.D.Pa. 1994)). 
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cases.  While some courts have considered child welfare agents’ 
conformance with their professional and statutory duties, and other 
courts have compared the circumstances of foster children to the 
circumstances of prisoners and mental health patients, a serious 
assessment of foster children’s interests has typically been lacking.  
Foster children’s constitutionally protected right to safety while in state 
care is too important to allow this issue to remain unresolved.172 
IV. CONSIDERING THE RELEVANT INTERESTS & CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 
STATE HAS A HEIGHTENED DUTY TO PROTECT FOSTER CHILDREN, 
SO THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD SHOULD BE 
ADOPTED 
To resolve this circuit split, the Supreme Court must delineate the 
duty to protect foster children by assessing what state conduct would be 
sufficiently conscience shocking to warrant liability.  As the Court has 
made clear, what shocks the conscience in one setting may not be so 
shocking in another.173  To determine the appropriate liability standard, 
the court must analyze the exact circumstances174 and balance the liberty 
interests of the individual against the relevant interests of the state.175 
Therefore, in the foster care context, the court should assess the 
peculiar circumstances of foster children and balance their interests with 
the interests of the government.  First and foremost, children have a 
significant interest in being protected from maltreatment.176  Indeed, it is 
central to their Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable risks of harm.  Correspondingly, the state has an important 
interest in protecting children from maltreatment.177 The government 
also has a general interest in the protection of its citizens.178  Beyond 
these interests, the peculiar circumstances of foster children place them 
in a much more vulnerable position than mental health patients and 
prisoners, and, therefore, the state should be held to a higher standard of 
 172 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347-48 (1816) (asserting “the importance, and 
even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects 
within the purview of the constitution.”); See generally Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional 
Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1160-85 
(2012) (discussing arguments for and against resolution of circuit splits regarding federal 
constitutional rights). 
 173 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998). 
 174 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. 
 175 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). 
 176 Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). 
 177 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997). 
 178 Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 340 (1993). 
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care in regards to foster children.  Weighing all of these interests and 
circumstances, it becomes clear that the state has a heightened duty to 
protect foster children from harm, and the professional judgment 
standard is the appropriate standard to apply in foster care maltreatment 
cases. 
A. INTERESTS IN PROTECTING CHILDREN AGAINST MALTREATMENT 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the critically important 
interest in protecting the welfare of our nation’s children.179  “It is the 
interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be 
both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into 
free and independent well-developed men and citizens.”180  Due to “the 
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the 
parental role in child rearing,” the constitutional rights of children are 
different than those of adults.181  In fact, Justice Brennan has suggested 
that children may even be entitled to greater constitutional protection 
than adults.182  Upon consideration of the interests of children to be 
protected from maltreatment, it is clear that Justice Brennan was right. 
The interests of children in being protected from abuse and being 
given the opportunities for healthy growth into adulthood183 are of 
utmost importance. When these interests are not protected, the 
ramifications can be devastating.  Child maltreatment is so injurious that 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has deemed it a public 
health problem.184  Immediate physical injuries range from bruises to 
broken bones to hemorrhage.185  Long-term effects of maltreatment may 
include physical ailments such as shaken baby syndrome, impaired brain 
 179 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 865 (noting “the State’s independent interest in the 
well-being of its youth”); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (discussing “the State’s 
traditional and ‘transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children”‘) (citing Ginsberg v. 
N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (noting 
“the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child”). 
 180 Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. 
 181 Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 182 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 183 Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. 
 184 REBECCA T. LEEB ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CHILD MALTREATMENT SURVEILLANCE 3 (2008), available at 
www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/CM_Surveillance-a.pdf. 
 185 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT 3 (2013), available at 
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/long_term_consequences.pdf. 
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development, and poor physical health.186  Moreover, the stress that 
children experience as a result of maltreatment can disrupt early brain 
development.187  It may also interfere with the development of the 
nervous system and regulation of the immune system.188 
Children who have been maltreated are also more likely to develop 
emotional, behavioral, and psychological problems.189  Psychological 
effects immediately apparent in maltreated children include feelings of 
isolation, fear, and loss of the ability to trust others.190  Long-term 
consequences may include low self-esteem, difficulty with relationships, 
depression, anxiety, and a variety of other psychological conditions.191  
When children experience severe and prolonged maltreatment, they are 
more likely to have health problems as adults, including alcoholism, 
depression, drug abuse, eating disorders, smoking, suicide, and certain 
chronic diseases.192  Furthermore, when a child is removed from his or 
her home because of severe maltreatment, the child may suffer additional 
emotional trauma from the removal itself.193 
Beyond the individual interests of children in being protected 
against these devastating effects, the state has a great interest in 
preventing abuse and neglect.  Child maltreatment poses a significant 
economic and social burden to society.  Each year, the expenses flowing 
 186 Id. at 3-4. 
 187 NAT’L SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD, EXCESSIVE STRESS DISRUPTS 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE DEVELOPING BRAIN, WORKING PAPER #3, at 2 (2005), available at 
http://developingchild.harvard.edu/index.php/resources/reports_and_working_papers/working_paper
s/wp3; CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT 4 (noting that child maltreatment may also result in poor academic performance, language 
development, and cognitive capacity). 
 188 Tiffany Watts-English et al., The Psychobiology of Maltreatment in Childhood, 62 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 717, 719 (2006), available at www.ocfcpacourts.us/assets/files/list-758/file-937.pdf. 
 189 See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 4-6. 
 190 Id. at 4. 
 191 Id. 
 192 D. Runyan et al., World Health Org., Child Abuse & Neglect by Parents & Other 
Caregivers, in WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 59, 69 (E. Krug et al. eds., 2002), 
available at www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/global_campaign/en/chap3.pdf. 
 193 CECILIA CASANUEVA ET AL., OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH & EVALUATION, ADMIN. 
FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, NO. 18: INSTABILITY AND EARLY LIFE CHANGES AMONG 
CHILDREN IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1 (2012), available at 
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/early_life.pdf.  Besides the initial trauma of removal, 
attachment is disrupted. When children do not develop healthy attachments with at least one 
caregiver, they are at great risk for cognitive delays, relationship dysfunction, and emotional 
development. CALL TO ACTION ON BEHALF OF MALTREATED INFANTS AND TODDLERS 4 (2011), 
available at www.zerotothree.org/public-policy/federal-policy/childwelfareweb.pdf. 
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from new cases of abuse and neglect total approximately $124 billion.194 
Every victim of fatal child abuse costs society almost $1.3 million, and 
every victim of nonfatal maltreatment costs over $210 thousand.195 
These estimates incorporate the increased medical costs,196 criminal 
justice costs,197 child welfare costs,198 educational costs,199 and 
productivity losses200 that result from child abuse and 201
Considering the individual and state interests in preventing child 
maltreatment, it is even more important for the state to ensure that 
children are protected from harm than it is to ensure the protection of 
adults.  Children are in their formative years, and the majority of 
physical, emotional, social, and intellectual development occurs during 
childhood.202  As a result, the potential impact of harm is greater for 
them than for adults.  Maltreatment during childhood may have lifelong 
consequences, but early intervention may provide children with the tools 
to rebound from abuse and neglect.203  Placing maltreated children into 
nurturing foster homes, where they can obtain proper care and treatment, 
protects their interests in safety and personal security.204  To maintain 
that safety, it is critical that foster care agents do more than simply 
respond to known harms, which is essentially all the deliberate 
indifference standard requires.  In contrast, by requiring that state agents 
comply with professional standards and make informed decisions, the 
professional judgment standard would require that caseworkers take a 
more active role in protecting foster children. 
 194 Xiangming Fang, et al., The Economic Burden of Child Maltreatment in the United States 
and Implications for Prevention, 36 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 156, 163 (2012). 
 195 Id. 
 196 The average lifetime healthcare cost per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $43,178.  Id. at 
160. 
 197 The average lifetime criminal justice cost per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $6,747.  
Id. 
 198 The average lifetime child welfare cost per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $7,728.  Id. 
 199 The average lifetime special education cost per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $7,999.  
Id. 
 200 The average lifetime productivity loss per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $144,360.  Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See generally, GREATER TWIN CITIES UNITED WAY, RESEARCH & PLANNING, EARLY 
CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR LIFE (July 2010), available at 
www.unitedwaytwincities.org/_asset/stt995/eli_BriefingPaperFinal.pdf. 
 203 See CALL TO ACTION ON BEHALF OF MALTREATED INFANTS AND TODDLERS 17. 
 204 See Melinda Smith & Jeanne Segal, Child Abuse and Neglect: Recognizing, Preventing, 
and Reporting Child Abuse, HELPGUIDE.ORG (Aug. 2013), available at 
www.helpguide.org/mental/child_abuse_physical_emotional_sexual_neglect.htm. 
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B. STATE’S INTERESTS IN THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP CONTEXT 
In assessing the duty to protect foster children, some courts have 
furthered their analyses by comparing the state interests served by taking 
foster children into state care with the interests served by taking mental 
health patients and prisoners into state custody.205  Those government 
interests include general protection206 and punishment.207  To further 
these interests, the state may take individuals involuntarily into its 
custody under its parens patriae208 power and under its police power.209  
Pursuant to its parens patriae powers, the government has the authority to 
protect individuals incapable of acting in their own best interests.210  Its 
police powers grant the state the authority to protect individuals from 
harm and to promote the public welfare.211 
So, the government essentially has dual interests in protection.  On 
one hand is its interest in safeguarding individuals who are unable to care 
for themselves.212  On the other hand is its interest in defending society 
at large from those it deems a threat to the general welfare.213  Removing 
children from the custody of parents unable to care for them, and placing 
the children in safe foster homes, serves the important interest in 
protecting them as individuals.214  Likewise, persons suffering from 
mental illness may be taken into state care for their protection when they 
are deemed unable to care for themselves.215  Unlike foster children, 
though, the government also uses its police powers to involuntarily 
commit someone with mentally illness when the person is deemed a risk 
to the safety of others.216  In the case of an institutionalized mental health 
patient, the state is interested in the protection of both the individual and 
 205 See, e.g.,, K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 857 (7th Cir. 1990); T.M. ex rel. 
R.T. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190-91 (D. Wyo. 2000); Kara B. v. Dane Cnty., 555 N.W.2d 
630, 634 (Wisc. 1996). 
 206 See Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 340 (1993) (noting the state’s “legitimate 
interests in protection, care, and treatment”). 
 207 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (noting that the state has an “interest in 
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation”). 
 208 Latin for “parent of his or her country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (9th ed. 2009). 
 209 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975). 
 210 Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under 
Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 264 (2003). 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). 
 215 Addington v. Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). 
 216 Id. 
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society, because the person has been judged so mentally ill that he poses 
a threat to himself and others.217  Criminals, in contrast, are taken into 
state custody under the police power theory largely for the protection of 
society.218  Unlike foster children and mental health patients, criminals 
are not detained by the government for the purpose of protecting them as 
individuals. 
In addition to protection, the government may take a person into 
state custody for the purpose of punishment.  The primary state interests 
served by taking criminals into its custody include the protection of 
society219 and the punishment of the individual.220 The government has a 
duty to protect prisoners only to the extent that maltreatment may not be 
so bad that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.221  As a result, 
the conditions of prisons may be harsh, but liability may only attach 
when harm serves no “legitimate penological objectiv[e].”222  In 
comparison, the Supreme Court has noted that those who have been 
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate conditions than 
prisoners, because the conditions of confinement for prisoners are 
“designed to punish,”223 and mental health patients “may not be punished 
at all.”224  The government interests served by involuntarily commitment 
include protecting the individual and protecting society from the 
mentally ill individual.  Like mental health patients, foster children are 
not taken into state care for the purpose of punishment.225  In stark 
contrast, the singular societal interest in foster care is the protection of 
the child. 
Comparing the state’s interests in the protection and punishment of 
prisoners, mental health patients, and foster children, it is clear that foster 
children are most similar to mental health patients.  Not only is the 
state’s duty to protect foster children at least as great as it’s duty to 
protect mental health patients, considering the particular circumstances 
of foster children, the government should be subject to a heightened duty 
to protect the children in foster care. 
 217 Id. 
 218 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975). 
 219 See id. 
 220 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
 221 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
 222 Id. at 833 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 548 (1984)). 
 223 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982). 
 224 Id. at 315-16. 
 225 Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). 
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C. DUE TO THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF FOSTER CHILDREN, 
THE STATE HAS A HEIGHTENED DUTY TO PROTECT THEM FROM 
HARM 
 
1. The State Steps into the Shoes of the Foster Child’s Parents 
In furtherance of the individual and state interests in child 
protection, the government may remove a child from the care of his or 
her natural parents, assuming the temporary role of parent.226  With that 
role comes the expectation that the state will fulfill the duties reasonably 
expected of a parent.227  The Supreme Court has recognized that a parent 
has an interest in “and obligation for the welfare and health of the 
child.”228  In the foster care system, the state has taken on the temporary 
legal role of parent, and the foster parents effectively serve as caretakers.  
As “parent,” though, it is the state’s responsibility to ensure that the 
caretaker is not doing anything to harm the child.  Because the 
government actively takes on the role of parent, it assumes a heightened 
duty to protect foster children. 
The importance of the parental role is magnified by the child’s 
“peculiar vulnerability” and “inability to make critical decisions in an 
informed, mature manner.”229  By assuming the temporary role of parent 
for foster children, the state acknowledges that the children are not 
capable of taking care of themselves.  Unlike most adults, who can take 
care of their own basic and medical needs, contact law enforcement if 
they are being maltreated, and logically assess their options, children 
generally need the guidance and assistance of adults.230  While older 
children can certainly protect themselves to a greater extent than infants 
 226 K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 855 (7th Cir. 1990) (Coffey, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. 
N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 227 K.H. ex rel. Murphy, 914 F.2d at 855 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (quoting Nelson v. Heyne, 
491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 894. 
 228 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 229 Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). At the international level, the United Nations 
has also declared “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special 
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection.” Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 
G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 19 U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959), available at 
www.unicef.org/lac/spbarbados/Legal/global/General/declaration_child1959.pdf. 
 230 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT & 
COMPETENCY 4-6 (2010), available at www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-adolescent.pdf. 
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and toddlers, their competence to fully understand their rights and 
remedies may not be as developed as adults.231 
In contrast, adult prisoners are not only capable of protecting their 
own interests; they are largely required to do so.  They do not need and 
are not entitled to “parental” protection.  The understanding that 
prisoners must take an active role in protecting their own interests is 
reflected in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA).232  Pursuant to the 
PRLA, a prisoner may not bring an action under § 1983 until he or she 
has exhausted all available administrative remedies.233  Furthermore, 
prisoners are primarily responsible for their own wellbeing and for 
maintaining the conditions of their personal space.234  Since adult 
inmates are generally capable of fending for themselves, it would not be 
shocking to require them to notify prison officials if they were at risk of 
harm.  Thus, it is not unreasonable to require, as the deliberate 
indifference standard does, that a prison official have actual knowledge 
of harm before liability may be imposed. 
Unlike prison inmates, those who have been involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution are generally not able to make 
decisions for themselves and to protect their own interests,235 but they 
are also not provided with “parental” care by the state.  While 
involuntary commitment is effected in part through the government’s 
parens patriae power, the state does not actually step into the role of 
parent for mental health patients.  Children who have been committed are 
still primarily the responsibility of their parents, as commitment does not 
normally involve the termination of parental rights.236  Adults may have 
 231 Id. 
 232 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1996)). 
 233 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (Westlaw 2014). 
 234 See, e.g.,, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE INFORMATION HANDBOOK, FCI/SCP 
GILMER (2012), available at www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/gil/GIL_aohandbook.pdf (inmate 
responsibilities include: maintaining the cleanliness of the inmate’s living area, arriving at work on 
time, knowing the amount of money in his commissary account, keeping “call-out” appointments, 
and generally understanding and complying with all institution policies). 
 235 JOHN A. MENNINGER, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT: HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICATIONS 
1, available at 
www.brown.edu/Courses/BI_278/Other/Clerkship/Didactics/Readings/INVOLUNTARY%20TREA
TMENT.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
 236 Cf. 39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward § 9 (2013) (“[A] guardian should not be appointed where 
at least one parent is living and is not found to be unfit or incapacitated or to have relinquished or 
forfeited his or her rights.”). But see MARY GILIBERTI & RHODA SCHULZINGER, BAZELON CENTER 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, RELINQUISHING CUSTODY: THE TRAGIC RESULT OF FAILURE TO MEET 
CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2000), available at 
www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=-hWbIbUX5v8%3d&tabid=104 (explaining that, due to 
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 care than prisoners. 
 
guardians appointed,237 but they are not provided parental care from the 
state.  Also unlike foster children, mental health patients often find 
support in family members concerned with their wellbeing.238  Even 
though the state does not have a heightened duty to protect involuntarily 
committed mental health patients, the patients are still entitled to more 
considerate
To an even greater extent than mental health patients, children are in 
need of guidance and protection.  It is imperative that the state take an 
active role in their protection, beyond just responding to obvious risks.  
As one court so eloquently stated, “[s]omething more than refraining 
from indifferent action is required to protect these innocents.”239  The 
professional judgment standard is more appropriate for the state’s 
heightened “parental” duty to protect foster children, because it requires 
that caseworkers actively avail themselves of the information necessary 
to make learned professional decisions about those in their care. 
2. Foster Children Rely on Caseworkers to Guard Their Safety 
Children who have been removed from their parents’ care have a 
critical need for someone to advocate for their best interests.240  As one 
court has explained, “the law does not impose the duty of guarding their 
own safety on wards of the state.  Rather, that duty is the quintessential 
responsibility of the caseworkers assigned to safeguard the well-being of 
this helpless and vulnerable population.”241 
Foster children need caseworkers to ensure that they remain safe 
while in state care, due in large part to the tendency for children to 
remain silent regarding maltreatment.  One reason for this is that they 
often see the abuse as “normal” and fear another relocation.242  In 2012, 
the alleged victims submitted only 0.4% of the reports of child 
exorbitant costs, many families are effectively forced to choose between obtaining mental health 
treatment for their children and retaining legal custody). 
 237 J. Howard Ziemann, Incompetency and Commitment Proceedings, 8 AM. JUR. Trials 483 § 
2 (2014). 
 238 Neil H. Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing 
Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 628 (1979). 
 239 Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). 
 240 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 241 Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 843 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 242 Susanne Babbel, The Foster Care System and Its Victims: Part 2, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 
(Jan. 3, 2012), www.psychologytoday.com/blog/somatic-psychology/201201/the-foster-care-system-
and-its-victims-part-2. 
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maltreatment.243  There are many reasons that children who have been 
abused choose not to report the abuse, including shame, fear of 
punishment, prior victimization, and self blame.244  Also, the perpetrator 
may threaten to harm the child if he or she reports the abuse.245  When 
questioned, these reasons may also result in the child denying the 
abuse.246  When children have been abused by their parents, they often 
develop difficulty trusting others,247 and therefore may be less likely to 
confide in caseworkers regarding abuse in foster homes.  The existence 
of mandatory reporting laws throughout the county248 is clear evidence 
that legislatures and child welfare agencies recognize that children often 
do not speak up for themselves. 
Due to the particularly vulnerable circumstances of foster children 
and the reality that many do not report the maltreatment they experience, 
it is essential that caseworkers play an active role in protecting them.  
Statutory mandates and industry standards for monitoring child 
placement have been designed to provide the affirmative protections 
needed to safeguard foster children.249 
Several courts have held that when a professional failed to act in 
accord with state laws or agency rules, he or she may be found to have 
 243 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 
2012, at 12 (2013), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2012.pdf. 
 244 Reasons Why Children do not Tell, THE NEST CHILD ADVOCACY CTR., 
www.nestcac.org/WhyDontKidsTell.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (also citing fear no one will 
believe them, fear of loss, loyalty to the offender, instruction to secrecy, belief the child is protecting 
siblings from abuse, desire to prevent breakup of family unit); Reasons Why Children do not Tell, 
CHILD SAFE OF CENT. MO., www.childsafehouse.org/get-informed/reasons-not-tell.cfm (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2014); see also Melinda Smith & Jeanne Segal, Child Abuse and Neglect: Recognizing, 
Preventing, and Reporting Child Abuse, HELPGUIDE.ORG (Aug. 2013), 
www.helpguide.org/mental/child_abuse_physical_emotional_sexual_neglect.htm. 
 245 See DERRY KORALEK, CAREGIVERS OF YOUNG CHILDREN: PREVENTING AND RESPONDING 
TO CHILD MALTREATMENT 17 (1992), available at 
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/caregive/caregive.pdf. 
 246 Reasons Why Children do not Tell, THE NEST CHILD ADVOCACY CTR. (also citing fear no 
one will believe them, fear of loss, loyalty to the offender, instruction to secrecy, belief the child is 
protecting siblings from abuse, desire to prevent breakup of family unit); Reasons Why Children do 
not Tell, CHILD SAFE OF CENT. MO. 
 247 Smith & Segal, Child Abuse and Neglect: Recognizing, Preventing, and Reporting Child 
Abuse. 
 248 See CHILD WELFARE INFO. MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2 
(2012), available at www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf 
(describing mandatory reporting laws across the U.S. and its territories). 
 249 See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
CONCERNED WITH CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION (2012), available at 
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegis.pdf. 
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substantially departed from “professional judgment.”250  A pattern of 
failures to ensure foster home licensing standards are met, to perform 
child-specific home studies, and to perform minimum monthly home 
visits251 should subject child welfare agents to liability if a foster child is 
harmed as a result.  Caseworker visits, in particular, are “critical” to 
ensuring the safety of children in the foster care system.252  As one court 
noted, foster children are “isolated . . . [and] helpless,” and without 
proper supervision of the foster home, the child is “at the mercy of the 
foster parents.”253  If these duties are not performed, the fact that a 
caseworker is unaware of signs of maltreatment, and therefore does not 
conclude that a child is being harmed, should not preclude the child from 
obtaining a remedy.  In that instance, the government has failed to 
perform its heightened “parental” duty to protect foster children and 
should be held liable for the resulting harm. 
3. Supervision by Foster Parents is Minimal 
In defining the limits of the state’s duty to protect, several courts 
have also considered the degree of supervision that government agents 
have over the persons in their care.254  For example, the Ninth Circuit 
justified its contrary use of the professional judgment standard for mental 
health patients and the deliberate indifference standard for foster children 
by asserting that the application of different standards is “logical” 
because “the degree of control and day-to-day responsibility that the 
government exerts over [mental health patients] is considerably 
higher.”255  Another court noted that there is a “closer relationship” 
between prison officers and inmates than there is between child welfare 
agents and foster children.256  In prisons, state agents have daily contact 
with inmates, so they are better able to monitor potentially harmful 
 250 See, e.g.,, Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1990); Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 
831 F.2d 1430, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987) (Ferguson, J., concurring). 
 251 The federal government has concluded that one major reason so many states do not 
comply with child welfare law requirements is that state child welfare agencies are understaffed. 
Maria Scannapieco & Kelli Connell-Carrick, Child Welfare Workplace: The State of the Workplace 
and Strategies to Improve Retention, CHILD WELFARE 31, 32 (2007). 
 252 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS 
WITH CHILDREN AND PARENTS 3 (2006), available at 
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cyf/caseworkervisits.pdf. 
 253 Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 254 See Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 n.8 (9th Cir. 
2011); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor, 818 F.2d at 796. 
 255 Ammons, 648 F.3d at 1029 n.8. 
 256 Taylor, 818 F.2d at 796. 
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activity and its effect upon inmates.257  Another court has noted that it is 
more difficult to protect children from maltreatment in private foster 
homes than it is to protect them in institutions.258  Whereas state actors 
have daily contact with prisoners and mental health patients, foster 
children are visited approximately once a month.259 
Underlying the claim that frequency of contact is relevant to the 
liability standard is the reality that it is more difficult for the government 
to monitor foster homes than it is to monitor institutions.  However, the 
paramount interest in child protection—an interest shared by the state 
and the children in its care—should take precedence over a governmental 
claim of inconvenience.  It is, in fact, the state that creates this difficult 
situation when it elects to remove the child from his or her home and 
place the child with strangers, rather than with government agents.  This 
election may be a better choice for foster children than institutional 
care,260 but it should not lessen the duty of the government to protect the 
child.  As one court has noted, “[i]t should have been obvious from the 
day Youngberg was decided that a state could not avoid the 
responsibilities which that decision had placed on it merely by delegating 
custodial responsibility to irresponsible private persons.”261  When the 
state has chosen to remove a child from the custody of his parents, and 
then places the child in a home that the state only monitors 
intermittently, it should at a very minimum follow basic standards to 
ensure the home is safe. 
Given the heightened duty to protect foster children, the state’s 
minimal contact with foster parents should serve as a reason for higher 
expectations of foster care agents, not lower.  In contrast to foster homes, 
the daily monitoring in prison and mental institutions provides more 
opportunities for the government to gain knowledge of maltreatment.  
Professional and statutory standards for foster home visits, 
investigations, and licensures have been designed in recognition of the 
state’s reduced control of foster homes.  Since caseworkers have fewer 
 257 Id. 
 258 K.H. ex rel. Murphy, 914 F.2d at 852. 
 259 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS 
WITH CHILDREN AND PARENTS 3 (2006), available at 
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cyf/caseworkervisits.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2008-2011: REPORT TO CONGRESS 19 
(2013), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cwo08_11.pdf (reporting that 
approximately 82% of foster children received monthly visits in 2011, of the states reported). 
 260 See Brenda Jones Harden, Safety and Stability for Foster Children: A Developmental 
Perspective, 14 CHILD, FAMILIES, & FOSTER CARE 31, 38 (2004), available at 
www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_01_02.pdf. 
 261 K.H. ex rel. Murphy, 914 F.2d at 851. 
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opportunities to interact with foster families, it is crucial that they 
comply with these standards.  If they fail to do so, they should be held 
liable under the professional judgment standard. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be plainly shocking for the state to shirk its duty because it 
is not itself the daily caretaker of foster children.  Application of the 
deliberate indifference standard allows government agents to avoid 
liability in this way.  In contrast, the professional judgment standard 
recognizes the need for proactive measures on the part of state agents.  
Under the professional judgment standard, the government would only 
be liable if its agents exhibited an egregious pattern of failures to fulfill 
their professional mandates—simple negligence would not result in 
liability.  When caseworkers have been so derelict in their duties that 
they do not know children in their care are at substantial risk for harm, 
when proper monitoring would have provided such knowledge, they 
cannot be reasonably said to have exercised professional judgment.  
When their actions or failures to act are based on a professionally 
inadequate knowledge base, those actions or omissions should be 
considered so arbitrary as to be conscience shocking. 
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